Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
"Andreas Most" schrieb

Ilja Schmelzer wrote:

"Andreas Most" schrieb

Ilja Schmelzer wrote:

...
A box containing some liquid in equilibrium also, in some sense,
summarizes the information I have about the liquid. Therefore the
box is not a physical object?

This would not tell me anything. You also need to tell me the size
of the box, temperature, type of liquid, entropy etc.


All these are properties of the box. Note we are in equilibrium,
moreover the word "only for water" is written on the box, and all
observations up to now have shown that such boxes are used
only for water.

You were talking about some liquid, not water.


I have specified my toy example after your criticism.


(Equilibrium is relevant, because from point of Bohmian mechanics
the wave function defines the quantum equilibrium state.)

Yes, but you would still need to know the temperature, the pressure,
etc.


They may be measured by measuring properties of the box.


I think we are not getting to the point with this example. (Nicht alles,
was hinkt, ist auch ein Beispiel...)


I think for the purpose I have invented it it is already sufficient.
The box allows to describe most of the properties (if not all)
of the water in it, similar to the wave function. Nonetheless it is
a real object. Thus, your argumentation is faulty.

I would consider the box being the electron, not the wave function.
A measurement is perfromed on the physical object. The wave function
is just a mathematical object, that tells me about the possible outcomes
of a mesurement. The electron is not the wave function. The wave
function only describes the electron's behaviour.
It seems as if you are trying to tell me with your example that the
moon's orbit is the moon itself.

In the EPR case no information is transferred between the two
particles
nor is it possible to communicate with such an EPR setup.

That it is not possible to communicate with an EPR device is a proven
theorem. But why do you think no information is transferred?

If information were transferred there would be a way to communicate in a
EPR setup. But there is no indication of any information transfer.

No. There is no reason to assume that some [should be no] hidden
information channel
may be used. And there is a very strong indication - the violation of
Bell's inequality.

That is what I said!

Sorry, that was a typo.

Also the quantum mechanical description works perfectly without
transferring information.

The quantum mechanical description (in its minimal interpretation)
is not a realistic one in the sense used by Bell. We can easily
transform it into a realistic interpretation, following BM.
In this case we have a real mechanism transferring information.

Now I am confused. You just confirmed that there is no hidden
information channel, but now you are talking again about information
transfer.

Don't be confused, that was just a typo.

Instead, Bell's theorem proves that, if you insist that no information
is transferred, you have to give up realism. But once you give up
realism, it makes no sense to say that no information is transferred.

It seems as if you have not understood Bell's theorem. Bell proved that
if hidden variables are involved in measurements in quantum mechanics
you have to give up locality.

That's another formulation.

"Hidden variables" is a bad word for realism, it sounds like it is not
worth to care if we reject them. Moreover, "is involved" sounds like
it is a very strange idea to "involve" them.

Calling them "realism" is taking "hidden variables" already for granted.

To decide which word is more appropriate - realism or hidden variables -
we have to look into the details. Hidden variables implies that we can
reject all this without much care. Realism implies that we need very strong
arguments to reject it, or that we would better take it for granted.

The main problem with hidden variables (or "realism" as you call it) is
that it has not led to new insights in physics. It does not provide any
new predictions that go beyond what quantum physics does using the
null hypothesis.

To be clear, I think we make no error if we take it for granted. It is
IMHO some sort of extended logic of science.

There are things which we have to take for granted to be able to do
science. (For example, the law which forbids contradictions. Without
this, contradictions in our theories are not problems, no problems
are, therefore, left, and there remains no open scientific problem.
Note: Whatever the contradictions in empirical evidence, we will
not reject the logical law that forbids contradictions.)

In a similar reasoning, we can add some other principles. This includes
IMHO classical logic, classical probability theory and some basic
principles of realism.

IMHO all interpretations of quantum mechanics try to describe quantum
mechanical behaviour with explanations that fits better into our
world view which is biased by classical physics.
People are rather inventing weird ideas about hidden variables or
multiverses than accepting that quantum behaviour is as natural as is
the behaviour we know from classical physics.


"Locality" is, on the other hand, a very good word for Einstein
causality.

Ooops, "locality" and "causality" are two different things. Locality is
assumed because of causality. However, the inverse conclusion doesn't
work.

In the original proof of Bell's inequality the additional requirement is
Einstein causality. AFAIU, in considerations about Bell's inequality
locality is used as a sloppy replacement instead of Einstein causality.

When talking about physics one shouldn't be too sloppy.

If you use another meaning of locality, please explain. If you use it
in another meaning (say, for example, in such a meaning that a
theory with limiting speed of 10^20 c is local), then, of course,
the violation of Bell's equality for space-like separated events
is compatible with local realism.

Sounds like it is very, very bad to give it up. But let's remember that
Newtonian theory is "nonlocal". Thus, nonlocal theories are nothing
very bad.

You should know better than this. Newtonian theory is only an
approximation for small velocities and weak gravitational fields.

I know. Nonetheless, it is a nonlocal theory, that means, nonlocal
theories are legitimate part of science. Maybe only as intermediate
theories until some very big limiting speed will be found.

Yes, but only insofar as we now where the limits of this nonlocality
are.
Are you trying to tell me that we should accept nonlocality for now
and find later a theory that will show that this assumption was only
an approximation?

In this context you may safely assume that time is absolute and
interactions occur instantaneously. In this approximation the theory
is nonlocal. But it is dangerous to conclude that you can generalize
this concept as it already doesn't work in general relativity.

General relativity needs only minor modifications to become
compatible with a preferred frame (named in GR context
preferred foliation).

Apart from the fact that I don't know why somebody would want to
introduce a "preferred frame", what has this to do with nonlocality?

There remains nonetheless some difference in the formulations. You
have to take a look at the actual proof. It proves that the results of
the measurements cannot be independend of the decisions of the
experimenters at the other end. As a consequence, if the measurements
are space-like separated, Einstein causality is violated.

Causality is not violated because it is not possible to exchange
information with such a setup. And although experimentor A might
already know what B will measure, B must still use a superposed state
for the description of his system. There is no contradiction in doing so.

Assume we observe a situation which allows only two explanations:
Or A gives information to B, or B gives information to A.

This has nothing to do with a EPR setup.

In this case we can be sure that there exists some information channel.
But it also follows that we cannot use this hidden channel to transfer
information. To use it to transfer information from A to B is impossible
if the correct explanation is that the information was transferred from
B to A. And reverse.

I can't follow your argumentation here.

Your argumentation therefore leads to a contradiction. In a situation
where some hidden channel exists you can show that no such channel
exists.

Your were starting from a wrong assumption from which you may conclude
anyhing.

"Realistic interpretation" simply means that you have to specify (in
your
interpretation) which objects of your theory are real physical objects.
Correct?

I did that in the previous posts.
The physical reality is what you can measure, i.e. the observables.

In this case, QM does not describe reality, but only allows to
compute, without explanation, some probability distributions.

What is your definition of reality?
Physicists are interested in describing the world. They are
not interested in describing something that has no impact on what
we observe. Apart from that, there is not necessarily an explanation
for everything. E.g. we take for granted mathematics and the existence
of space, time and matter.

The wave function is unobservable. Therefore it makes no sense to
consider the wave function as a physical object.
And btw, this is not "my" interpretation.

It is the minimal interpretation. Shut up and calculate. What really
happens, what really leads to the observable probability distributions,
remains unexplained.

In classical physics you do not question the existence of matter and the
equations of motion. Why do you need an explanation for the equations of
quantum mechanics?

All realistic interpretations I know of use the wave function as a
real object. Feel free to invent another one to justify your claim.

I cannot see that any of these interpretations can explain anything
beyond the interpretation, which considers the wave function solely
as a mathematical object.

In BM, the probability distributions of QM are derived from
the basic equations, which are deterministic.

Then, if we assume that the "real objects" which define the behaviour
of the quantum state do not predefine/influence the decisions of the
two experimenters A,B, and that there is no causal influence
A-B or B-A, then Bell's inequality holds.
It is violated, and I conclude A-B or B-A.

You are certainly aware of the fact that this conclusion is a
direct consequence of your assumptions. Namely, that the wave
function is a "real" object. Because of that, I avoid this type
of interpretation.

No. It is (part of) Bell's theorem. It does not assume that
the wave function is real. All it assumes is that

1.) There exists some set of possible states of "reality" L
with probability distribution rho(l)

2.) The results of the measurements m depend on this state
and the decisions of experimenters a: m=m(l,a)

so that the resulting probability distribution of measurement
results will be

rho(x,a) = int delta(x-m(l,a)) rho(l) dl

No assumption is made that the wave function is part of l. We
obtain Bell's inequality if we subdivide the decisions of experimenters
and the measurement results into two parts
A=A(l,a,b), B=B(l,a,b) and add as the additional Einstein
causality assumption A=A(l,a), B=B(l,b) only.

In a GHZ setup you would also have to assume that your measurement
result also depends on the measurement setups of the other experiments
or else you run into a contradiction. That is A=A(l,a) doesn't work.
In a space-like separation of the measurements it is not clear whose
measurement setup is influencing the others measurements. You can
maybe overcome this dilemma by giving up "free will" in that the
experimentors are not free in choosing their setup.
Anyway, this is what I would call "spooky action at a distance".

But I will not keep you from continueing this track. Maybe you
can find a solution to the so called measurement problem by that.

The measurement problem is solved in standard BM. No
need to search for a solution.

Maybe, but at which cost?


Ilja

Hi Ben,

thanks for your support.
Moreover, your description gave me a revelation in understanding the
quantum mechanical arrow of time. I was looking for a way to reverse
time's arrow in QM (similar to the case of thermodynamics, where the
direction of time can not be deduced from the boundary conditions)
but didn't come to this simple solution.
Thank you for that.

Andreas.


Ben Rudiak-Gould wrote:
Ilja Schmelzer wrote:

All realistic interpretations I know of use the wave function as a
real object. Feel free to invent another one to justify your claim.


You may be right about that, but I'll take you up on your invitation to
invent another one.

The quantities that we can actually measure in quantum mechanics are
probabilities derived from quantum amplitudes of the form

psi_f| e^(iH (t_f - t_i)) |psi_i

This is the amplitude that we will find a system in state psi_f at time
t_f given that we found/prepared it in state psi_i at time t_i. The wave
function that you take as real is

|psi(t) = e^(iH (t - t_i)) |psi_i,

which is defined at every time from the initial preparation to the final
measurement. The measured probability is |psi_f|psi(t_f)|^2.

I propose to take

|psi'(t) = e^(iH (t - t_f)) |psi_f

as real instead. The measured probability is then |psi'(t_i)|psi_i|^2.
The realistic interpretation is that the wave function converges to the
measured eigenstate just before the measurement, and decollapses to a
superposition of eigenstates just after the measurement.

The fact that it works either way means that the apparent thermodynamic
evolution of the wave function is entirely independent of classical
thermodynamic evolution; one can postulate a quantum mechanical arrow of
time that runs backwards from the classical arrow of time, without
contradicting experiment. It's because of this that I think both
pictures are probably wrong.


On a separate note, I worry that your attempts to quantize your ether
theory are doomed to failure for purely practical reasons. Quantizing an
ether version of GR (i.e. a field theory on a fixed background) is the
first thing people tried, and it doesn't work at high energies. As far
as I can tell, what you're doing is exactly the same.

-- Ben

Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
...
This would be not my example. In my example what is measured
is the state of water. Water in equilibrium but inside a very strange
form. You observe a probability distribution which is high in some
domain (inside the box) and zero else. You can easily describe this
probability distribution by defining some analogon of a "wave function".

The box is not the probability function although you can say that the
box defines the probability function. I.e. it defines where the
probability is 1 and where it is 0.

A measurement is perfromed on the physical object.

In this example, the water.

That is what I said.

The wave function
is just a mathematical object, that tells me about the possible outcomes
of a mesurement.

In our analogon, the "wave function" which is 1 inside the box and 0
outside.
Also a mathematical object. Nonetheless, there is some other real
object which corresponds to it.

Which is?

The electron is not the wave function. The wave
function only describes the electron's behaviour.

How do you know that it doesn't describe anything else?

That is what it is for. What else should it describe?

You know that it describes the probability distribution for the
electron. That's all.

You name it!

It seems as if you are trying to tell me with your example that the
moon's orbit is the moon itself.

Not at all. I clearly distinguish the water and the box.

Sure.

To decide which word is more appropriate - realism or hidden variables -
we have to look into the details. Hidden variables implies that we can
reject all this without much care. Realism implies that we need very
strong
arguments to reject it, or that we would better take it for granted.

The main problem with hidden variables (or "realism" as you call it) is
that it has not led to new insights in physics.

It certainly has. Bell was very impressed by Bohmian mechanics (read him).
The purpose of his famous inequality was to show that one of the features
of BM - its nonlocality - is not a fault but a necessary property of
realistic (hidden variable) theories.

Now, Bell's inequality and the related tests are clearly a very important
new insight.

I do not deny that it lead to the insight that hidden variable theories
are nonlocal and contextual.

It does not provide any
new predictions that go beyond what quantum physics does using the
null hypothesis.

Of course, it is the defining property of a hidden variable theory to make
the same predictions. But the hidden variable theory is only the first step.
Starting from it we can search for theories which differ from QM in
its predictions. The usual way is to look for the weak places of
the hidden variable theory and to modify them.

Bohm's theory is around for about 50 years. During this time there was
no prediction made which is not described by conventional quantum
mechanics. For that I hesitate to give up well established principles
like locality, i.e. the independance of space-like separated events.

This is the way I have developed my own theory of gravity. I have
started by a "hidden variable" theory for GR (GR in harmonic gauge).
Then, the "not so nice" place was that the harmonic condition was
not an Euler-Lagrange equation, so I have introduced additional
terms to make it an Euler-Lagrange equation. The resulting theory
already makes some different predictions (inflation, stable frozen
stars instead of black holes). (See gr-qc/0205035)

Yes, but you certainly know that these predictions are not yet
confirmed by observations. And, as I understand from a short look
at your paper, there are two parameters xi and upsilon which have
to be determined. If they turn out to be 0, I take it you only
describe GR.

In a similar reasoning, we can add some other principles. This includes
IMHO classical logic, classical probability theory and some basic
principles of realism.

IMHO all interpretations of quantum mechanics try to describe quantum
mechanical behaviour with explanations that fits better into our
world view which is biased by classical physics.
People are rather inventing weird ideas about hidden variables or
multiverses than accepting that quantum behaviour is as natural as is
the behaviour we know from classical physics.

Nature is of course natural. The aim of physics is to understand nature,
not to leave it unexplained.

Of course, we have always the freedom not to consider strange things
as strange, to leave them without explanation, IOW, to ignore a problem.

Sometimes it may be even useful - if we see no chance to solve a problem,
it may be useful to leave it alone for some time. And to care more about
problems we are able to tackle.

But nonetheless, the problems we choose to ignore some time remain to
be open scientific problems.

So far I agree with you. However, my criticism heads towards theories
that try to fit QM in our classical picture of the world by giving
up well established principles. If these theories do not contribute
any new testable predictions that go beyond existing theories than there
is no reason to accept these.

...
Sounds like it is very, very bad to give it up. But let's remember that
Newtonian theory is "nonlocal". Thus, nonlocal theories are nothing
very bad.

You should know better than this. Newtonian theory is only an
approximation for small velocities and weak gravitational fields.

I know. Nonetheless, it is a nonlocal theory, that means, nonlocal
theories are legitimate part of science. Maybe only as intermediate
theories until some very big limiting speed will be found.

Yes, but only insofar as we now where the limits of this nonlocality
are.

Yep. But the limits of the nonlocality we observe in violations of
Bell's inequality may be different.

Are you trying to tell me that we should accept nonlocality for now
and find later a theory that will show that this assumption was only
an approximation?

That's certainly a possibility. Of course, it would have been very bad
for science if NM would have been rejected in Newtons time because
of its nonlocality. Not?

Come on. There was no concept of locality necessary at his time.
They were lucky with having an absolute time.

As well, it is nonsensical to reject BM because of its nonlocality.

As explained above: Why should I give up locality and not getting
anything for it?

In this context you may safely assume that time is absolute and
interactions occur instantaneously. In this approximation the theory
is nonlocal. But it is dangerous to conclude that you can generalize
this concept as it already doesn't work in general relativity.

General relativity needs only minor modifications to become
compatible with a preferred frame (named in GR context
preferred foliation).

Apart from the fact that I don't know why somebody would want to
introduce a "preferred frame",

For me, the initial reason was to solve the problem of time in quantum
gravity. (In the most trivial way.)

Good point. But I hope it's not too trivial so that spacetime is not
described wrong.

what has this to do with nonlocality?

If we have a preferred frame, we can have nonlocality in a causal way.
We simply go back to classical causality defined by absolute time.

So, relativity is wrong? You will have a hard time to explain all the
effects that can only be described relativistically.

The alternative would be closed causal loops.

Or maybe give up hidden variables?

There remains nonetheless some difference in the formulations. You
have to take a look at the actual proof. It proves that the results of
the measurements cannot be independend of the decisions of the
experimenters at the other end. As a consequence, if the measurements
are space-like separated, Einstein causality is violated.

But only if you make the assumption of hidden variables.

...
Assume we observe a situation which allows only two explanations:
Or A gives information to B, or B gives information to A.

This has nothing to do with a EPR setup.

It is exactly the EPR setup.

Tell me where exactly in the EPR paper they talk about giving
information from A to B or vice versa?
You seem to interpret EPR your way, but leave out the possible
third alternative that no information is exchanged at all.

The EPR setup can be explained using BM. BM is a classical
theory which needs a preferred frame.

For the given experimental situation, we can (because of the Lorentz
invariance of the observables) consider different explanations using
BM with different hypotheses about the preferred frame.

If we choose the preferred frame so that t(A) t(B), the explanation
given by BM tells that information is transferred from B to A. Note
that in _this_ explanation there is no information transfer into the past,
thus, not A - B.

If we choose the preferred frame so that t(B) t(A), the explanation
given by BM tells that information is transferred from A to B.

Thus, the observational facts are, indeed, compatible with two
different explanations.
Or A gives information to B, or B gives information to A.

You certainly know that this violates the equivalence principle.

In this case we can be sure that there exists some information channel.
But it also follows that we cannot use this hidden channel to transfer
information. To use it to transfer information from A to B is impossible
if the correct explanation is that the information was transferred from
B to A. And reverse.

I can't follow your argumentation here.

Hm. First part:

A-B = Einstein causality is false
B-A = Einstein causality is false
___________________________
(A-B) or (B-A) = Einstein causality is false.

I told you above: there is also the possibility of no information
exchange at all.

Second part:

If a device which can be used to transfer information transfer A-B,
then all possible explanations how it works have to include some information
transfer A-B.

Thus, a device which allows, as one of the possible explanations, one
without information transfer A-B, but, instead, explains everything
with information transfer B-A, cannot be used for information
transfer A-B.

Once, by assumption, there exists such an explanation, the device
cannot be used for information transfer A-B.

The same argumentation shows that it cannot be used to transfer information
B-A.

Your argumentation: If it cannot be used for information transfer,
Einstein causality holds.

Your logic still escapes me: you are saying because the information
transfer goes from B-A no information can be exchanged from A-B.
With the additional reverse case you conclude that information
cannot be exchanged between A and B.
But the statements cannot be true at the same time. In your
"preferred frame" is either t(A) t(B) or t(A) t(B).
And thus A-B or B-A is possible...

But we have already concluded that Einstein causality is false.
Contradiction.

You have concluded, not I.

Your argumentation therefore leads to a contradiction. In a situation
where some hidden channel exists you can show that no such channel
exists.

Your were starting from a wrong assumption from which you may conclude
anything.

I have presented an imaginable situation where your argument leads to the
wrong conclusions. To support your argument _you_ have to show that such a
situation is impossible.

Sorry, your situation is not imaginable. You are talking about a
situation where an information channel is present but no information
transfer is possible. This is in itself contradictory.
Furthermore, you asked me to imagine a situation with only two
possible explanations. I showed you that in the case of a quantum
mechanical description there is also a third explanation possible:
that there is no such information channel.
Because I think, locality is a reasonable and working assumption,
guess what my preferred explanation is.

But it is. This is exactly the case if we observe violations of Bell's
inequality.
(But remain realists, or do not refuse to use our common sense.)

"Common Sense" is obviously a relative term.

In this case, QM does not describe reality, but only allows to
compute, without explanation, some probability distributions.

What is your definition of reality?

---------------------------------------
Definition of realism:

With "realism" I denote the assumption that
every statistical experiment may be described
by a "realistic explanation" (realistic theory).

Definition of a statistical experiment:

A statistical experiment is described by

1.) a set of parameters of preparation A;
2.) a set of possible results M;
3.) a map Rho: A - Prob(M) where Prob(M) is the
space of probability distributions on M.

Thus, if we choose to measure with the parameters
a, we obtain a probability distribution
Rho(a,m) dm on the space M of measurement results.
Such a probability distribution defines an
expectation value E(f,a) for every measurable
bounded function f: M-R by

E(f,a)=int f(m) Rho(a,m) dm

and reverse: The probability distribution Rho(a,m)
is completely defined by all expectation values
E(f,a).

Definition of realistic explanation (theory):

A realistic explanation of a statistical
experiment (A,M,Rho) is defined by:

1.) a set L of possible "states of reality";
2.) a probability distribution rho in Prob(L);
3.) a map m: LxA - M

so that

E(f,a)= int f(m(l,a)) rho(l) dl

for every measurable test function f M-R.
----------------------------------------------

Advocatus Diavoli asks: Which one is the electron? Rho or E?

Physicists are interested in describing the world.

Indeed. The state l in L describes the part of the world
which is relevant for the experiment in question.

They are
not interested in describing something that has no impact on what
we observe.

Indeed. That's why they prefer the simplest model (L,rho)
which allows to explain the observed probabilities.

Apart from that, there is not necessarily an explanation
for everything. E.g. we take for granted mathematics and the existence
of space, time and matter.

I agree. What I have defined to be an explanation does not
explain why we have to use the space L and not something different,
and also takes logic and probability theory for granted.

On the other hand, not even space, time, and matter are
taken for granted. Thus, what is allowed as a possible explanation
is much more general. This is a point in favour of this concept,
it shows that it covers all possible, reasonable explanations.

Maybe, but it gives up to many working concepts without gaining
anything. And apart from not having any new predictions that can be
verified, you also must explain the rest of physics which now has
to live without these previously working concepts.

The wave function is unobservable. Therefore it makes no sense to
consider the wave function as a physical object.
And btw, this is not "my" interpretation.

It is the minimal interpretation. Shut up and calculate. What really
happens, what really leads to the observable probability distributions,
remains unexplained.

In classical physics you do not question the existence of matter and the
equations of motion. Why do you need an explanation for the equations of
quantum mechanics?

They do not fit into the scheme above.

There are certainly things that need to be explained. But I don't think
that a hidden variable theory will do it since the assumptions are
more weird than quantum mechanics itself.

The minimal interpretation tells us "shut up and calculate". It gives
only the probability distributions, no explanation as I have defined it.

Imagine we have some ghost in a castle, who appears at midnight every
Friday. We observe the ghost, and are able to predict that he will
appear next Friday at midnight. Would a scientist say "fine, there is
no problem, once we can compute the related probability distribution"?

If the possible explanation needed the assumption that the sun is
shining at that time, I would be better off staying with just the
probabilty distribution for now.

No assumption is made that the wave function is part of l. We
obtain Bell's inequality if we subdivide the decisions of experimenters
and the measurement results into two parts
A=A(l,a,b), B=B(l,a,b) and add as the additional Einstein
causality assumption A=A(l,a), B=B(l,b) only.

In a GHZ setup you would also have to assume that your measurement
result also depends on the measurement setups of the other experiments
or else you run into a contradiction. That is A=A(l,a) doesn't work.

Means, Einstein causality (as defined in the context of realism) is
violated.

Or you give up hidden variables.

In a space-like separation of the measurements it is not clear whose
measurement setup is influencing the others measurements.

Indeed. (That's the situation that we cannot tell if we have A-B or B-A.
See above.)

Didn't you say there is a preferred frame in which you have a defined
time order? Then there is definitely A-B or B-A, but not both.

You can
maybe overcome this dilemma by giving up "free will" in that the
experimentors are not free in choosing their setup.

Indeed. But this is a choice which has to be rejected if we want
to make science. BTW, if we make this choice, we have to give
up the notion of causality in general. Because, even in the simplest
case, you press a button and observe the behaviour of a light bulb,
you cannot conclude that your action causes the reaction of the
light bulb.

Correct. But I have read somewhere about this being proposed seriously.

Anyway, this is what I would call "spooky action at a distance".

Of course, something which requires to give up "free will" is
certainly spooky. But there is also the realistic choice. We accept
free will, we accept realism (as defined above). Then, once
we observe violations of Bell's inequality, we have to conclude
that there is some action at a distance which violates Einstein
causality.

But we don't have to give up causality. Because classical causality
in a hidden preferred frame can do the job.

Anyway, assuming that a measurement setup which is lightyears away will
influence my measurement here is beyond any common sense.

But I will not keep you from continueing this track. Maybe you
can find a solution to the so called measurement problem by that.

The measurement problem is solved in standard BM. No
need to search for a solution.

Maybe, but at which cost?

I see no costs.

I see a lot.

Andreas.


Ilja