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(Daniel Weston) wrote in message ...
Patrick, you keep saying that QM is a principle theory, not a constructive theory. Could you explain this conclusion. My interpretation of Einstein's comments that you have given us, is quite different. Thanks. ************************************************** ************ Is QM a principle theory? In the first place, all classifications are arbitrary. In the second place, I know that some posters feel that the "principled vs constructive" distinction serves no useful purpose in physics. I disagree and I'll make clear exactly why I disagree later. The central point of contention in the distinction between principle or constructive theories is the existence of a "hypothetical" ontological element in the theory. What is "hypothetical" and what is not as a physical concept is time dependent and established by convention (Poincare) of the physics community. Einstein's original idea of a hypothetical ontological element was this: If it's assumed to exist, but invisible, it's hypothetical. However, as useful as this notion was a 100 years ago, it's too impractical now. For practicality, instead of saying the "hypothetical electron" we just say the "electron," and hopefully remember that electrons are hypothetical in some ontological sense. I have chosen the term "ontological element" carefully. By "ontology" I mean existence in a material sense. To Einstein, the concepts of the luminiferous ether and the atom, if they should correspond to anything "real" at all, correspond to things materially "real," that is, they correspond to something made of matter. Ordinary matter, whatever it is metaphysically, is well describable physically: It has mass (get enough of it and you can weigh it); it has inertial properties; it is affected by the gravitational fields of other matter particles. Maybe you can think of more. OK, enough introduction. Let's begin with a quote from Einstein: We can distinguish various kinds of theories in physics. Most of them are constructive. They attempt to build up a picture of the more complex phenomena out of the materials of a relatively simple formal scheme from which they start out. Thus the kinetic theory of gases seeks to reduce mechanical, thermal, and diffusional processes to movements of molecules -- i.e., to build them up out of the hypothesis of molecular motion. When we say that we have succeeded in understanding a group of natural processes we invariably mean that a constructive theory has been found which covers the processes in question. Along with this most important class of theories there exists a second, which I will call 'principle-theories'; These employ the analytic, not the synthetic, method. The elements which form their bases and starting-point are not hypothetically constructed but empirically discovered ones, general characteristics of natural processes, principles that give rise to mathematically formulated criteria which these separate processes or the theoretical representations of them have to satisfy. Thus the science of thermodynamics seeks by analytical means to deduce necessary conditions, which separate events have to satisfy, from the universally experienced fact that perpetual motion is impossible. The advantages of the constructive theory are completeness, adaptability, and clearness, those of the principle theory are logical perfection and security of the foundations. The theory of relativity belongs to the latter class. In order to grasp its nature, one needs first of all to become acquainted with the principles on which it is based. Before I go into these, however, I must observe that the theory of relativity resembles a building \0 consisting of two separate stories, the special theory and the general theory. The special theory, on which the general theory rests, applies to all physical phenomena with the exception of gravitation; the general theory provides the law of gravitation and its relations to the other forces of nature. Found in: "What is the Theory of Relativity?", Einstein, Ideas and Opinions, Three Rivers Press, p. 228-9. I have written much on this quote on my website. See http://www.ajnpx.com/html/Science/Ho...long-haul.html http://www.ajnpx.com/html/Einstein's-search-for-meaningful-unification-in-physics.html I can at this point only do two things to clear up what Einstein meant by "principle vs constructive theories": First, I will place his characterizations of them in his time period for a context, providing his insight into Newton's mechanics as a starting point. Second, I will attempt to clarify what I think can be made into a doable and useful definition of these two terms. But first a definition. A "principle" is a law or heuristic in which one has great confidence. Einstein told us that he was once an etherist. He (apparently) accepted the Mechanical Program's dogma to explain all phenomena in terms of mechanics? But what is mechanics? Mechanics is the science that MODELS all matter as being aggregates of point mass particles in motion. Newton's mechanics adds to that description that masses interact via forces acting-at-a-distance. (Hertz's mechanics -- inspired by his positivist leanings -- does not use the force concept as a primitive.) The logical extension to this rigid approach would be to approximate matter as a continuum state. The mathematical distinction between these two approaches was profound, for in the former case one uses total differential equations and in the latter one uses partial differential equations. Einstein told us that this led the way for the development of field theories of electrodynamics. But a new way to conceive of physics arose as a result of the investigations of Faraday, Maxwell, and Lorentz, which was the field concept of interactions over space -- with changes to fields propagating at finite speeds. Einstein also told us that the physicist at the end of the 19th century had come to treat the EM fields as purely irreducible, meaning that they ceased to attach any physical meaning about them as "being states of some material ether" --- unless, of course, you were Einstein trying to lay a foundation for all of physics. This effort was to lead him to despair of the entire mechanical, constructivist approach to foundations in physics and to lead a whole generation of physicists into a new way to think about theory invention for the future. Because theory invention is important, the distinction between principle vs constructive theories is important. I'm going to be very speculative myself here about Einstein's motives. I have defined physics as the search for the smallest set of rules that completely describes the behavior of the inanimate material realm under natural conditions. My speculating is that Einstein would have liked this definition. I am going to proceed under this assumption. If I don't do this, there is no way I can find a satisfactory explanation of Einstein's use of the term "hypothetical" to his characterizations. The material world "exists" in two primary forms: that which can be seen by the naked eye, and that which cannot. That which can be seen by the naked eye is NOT hypothetical! (From the ontological standpoint of Einstein's metaphysics, this is the primary bootstrapping step.) However, we cannot see atoms or molecules or their paths through space with the unaided eye. The very existence and motions of molecules and theory motions through space are thus "hypothetical." Here's where the distinction making gets deep: Sure, molecules are "hypothetical," but they're "hypothetical" real in the sense that they are conceivable as limiting cases of visible matter simply made invisibly small. On the other hand, field doesn't even have that status. Field is not a limiting case of something visible. Field is purely speculative by these standards, a free creation of the human mind. To Einstein of 1905 prior to SR, the universe was modeled as a collection of three things: matter, fields by which matter interacts with matter, and absolute space (one leftover from Newton's mechanics and one possible space -- the rest frame of the luminiferous ether). Einstein would call SR a principle theory, yet it is an extension to Newtonian mechanics. So what's the status of Newtonian mechanics? Is it principled or constructive. Well, obviously it is constructive. It is founded on the assumption that matter is modeled as aggregates of this hypothetical thing called the point mass particle. The kinetic theory (the original statistical mechanics) is also a constructive theory for much the same reason. But classical thermodynamics -- Einstein's inspiration for how to design SR -- is a principle theory. It's not based on assumptions of what matter is made out of in the small range of existence, but, rather, is a theory built directly on equations (principles) that account for thermodynamic measurements. So, is SR really a principle theory if it is a generalization of the constructive theory of Newtonian mechanics. I say, no! As I have claimed many times, I do not always agree with Einstein. But, I can go so far as to claim that SR is an principled "extension" to Newtonian mechanics. For SR still retains that hypothetical point mass particle of Newton's mechanics, though it adds into the mix the principle of electrical charge and with it Maxwell's equations, the PoR, and the Light Principle. In its weak form the PoR is this: the general laws of physics (assuming such a concept of "general laws" is meaningful at all) have the same form in all inertial frames of reference. There is one more principle that people tend to overlook that is in that extension from Newtonian mechanics to SR: Which is the "Principle of Generalization" (PoG), which I coined. What if the unit of measure could randomly change in time in a given inertial reference frame? Such a weird occurrence could not be noticeable within that frame though. It's conceivable that the laws of physics could have the same form in all inertial frames of reference, yet there be no way to relate the laws between frames as is done with the Galilean or Lorentz transformations. Which would mean that the PoR could not be of any use as a heuristic for the discovering of new general laws of physics. However, our experience of comparing measurements made among different frames of reference does not lead us to believe that the units of measure of different frames are randomly changing to any noticeable degree. So, we have the justification for believing not only that there a laws of the same form in all inertial frames, but also that they are relatable somehow under spacetime transformations of coordinates. So, the PoG would be that any generalization of Newtonian mechanics must 1) not add to the number of absolute spaces, and 2) must have general laws which satisfy a covariance in the extended theory, and which reduces to Galilean covariance in the limit that the theory is in the "Newtonian domain of applicability." OK, we've now dealt with the meaning of "hypothetical" in Einstein's passage above. We have seen some examples of constructive and principled theories. But there's a bit more distinction making to do: Along with this most important class of theories there exists a second, which I will call 'principle-theories'; These employ the analytic, not the synthetic, method. The elements which form their bases and starting-point are not hypothetically constructed but empirically discovered ones, general characteristics of natural processes, principles that give rise to mathematically formulated criteria which these separate processes or the theoretical representations of them have to satisfy. What Einstein means here is simple enough for me, after I have now studied it for a long time. The point of either kind of theory -- constructive of principled -- is to say something about the visible material realm, because that's the testable realm in which the naked eye and all other measuring instruments exist. The distinction between these two kinds of theories, according to Einstein, is on how one forms the starting point! If you start with empirically induced principles about heuristics, laws, and/or measurements themselves and have avoided the ontological hypotheticalness of the invisible realm, you have created a principled theory. On the other hand, if you want to start by explaining the properties of the macroscopic realm in terms of hypothetical invisible ontological elements, you have created a constructive theory, by Einstein's characterizations. Einstein claimed that the PoR and the Light Principle are empirically deduced (I would say "induced"), not hypothetically supposed. I have no problem with that. But I don't like his distinctions between "analytic" and "synthetic." He could have left these terms out altogether and lost nothing in the characterization. This is all I can say about them. It appears that Einstein means by "analytic" that one starts with empirically induced laws or heuristics and makes logical deductions on them to arrive at empirically testable conclusions. On the other hand, "synthesis" means "putting together." So, I suppose Einstein meant by the use of the term "synthetic" that one builds up the visible world out of hypothetical real stuff that is invisible. So, finally, on to QM. I'm going to just use the Schroedinger theory for my explanation. A lot happened between 1905 and 1926. The existence of the electron and proton were no longer considered "hypothetical" by 1926. Physics had evolved to accept the existence of the electron and proton as a convention. Thus we can legitimately talk about principle theories of the hydrogen atom. Now, by the standards of the conventions held in 1926 there were in Schroedinger's theory no hypothetical ontological elements in it. Schroedinger started his theory on a number of principles: 1) that it should make contact with classical physics somewhere, he chose the principle of energy conservation. 2) That there are two fields involved, the electromagnetic field and a \psi field associated with the wave aspects of "particles" whose properties are to be determined by other principles. 3) The Principle of Analogy requires that the \psi field satisfy a second-order partial differential equation. 4) That the structure of this differential equation be constrained by those empirical principles that suggest a wave-particle duality, namely the de Broglie-Einstein relations. The resulting Schroedinger equation is one of the most brilliantly conceived equations in all of physics. On the one hand, the Schroedinger equation is a hodgepodge of principles. But, on the other hand, remember that a principle is a heuristic or law in which you have strong confidence. So, if the Schroedinger theory has been put together with inner consistency, its empirical conclusions should stand the test of time, and as Einstein put it, it will have "logical perfection and security of the foundations." I remember quite well one conversation I had with my mechanics professor in 1975. I asked him what he thought would be the future of physics. He was very convinced of two things: That classical thermodynamics would remain, but that quantum mechanics would be radically changed. At that time, I was a "good" physics students that didn't get involved in all that subversive stuff of the philosophy of physics or even Einstein's essays. So I had no perspective to challenge him on his assessment of the future of physics. But today, I have to chuckle at his reply. How ironic. Classical thermodynamics and QM are both principle theories, so why should one stand the test of time, but the other not?! I'm not referring, of course, to the future providing "deeper explanations." He knew that classical thermodynamics already had a deeper explanation in terms of kinetic theory. But if it isn't an issue of the future providing a deeper explanation of QM, then why wouldn't QM stand the test of time as well as classical thermodynamics? Which principle of QM that I mentioned above is the most likely to fail in the future? Perhaps the professor merely stumbled into making a "false comparison" fallacy. That is, he set up an analogy but didn't follow it properly. In any case, if physicists were more conversant in the philosophy of physics perhaps they wouldn't get these kinds of "extemporaneous philosophizings" goofed up. If QM is to fail, which principle that it is based on is going to be the one that fails it? Patrick |
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So, the basic axioms a
(1) The dispersion relation; W_uu required to be non-zero, (2) The existence of 2nd order equations of motion. Note, that the general dispersion functional W_uv (def)= (u dv/dt - dv/dt u)/(i h-bar) is symmetric. Functions of the coordinates commute, by axiom 1 (taking the limit dt - 0) .... which I didn't explicitly list; (1) The dispersion relation: u(t) v(t+dt) - v(t+dt) u(t) = O(dt). with W_uv defined by (u(t)v'(t) - v'(t)u(t))/(i h-bar), and W_uu != 0 unless u(q) = constant. As mentioned in the quoted article; it follows from (1) and (2) that the classical limit of the system be that described by a Hamiltonian H(q,v) with (A(q,v)B(q,v)-B(q,v)A(q,v))/(i h-bar) - {A,B} in the limit; and dA/dt - {A,H} in the limit. The extra assertion required to characterize when the inverse limit is described by Canonical quantization, I believe is: (3) W_{qi qj} commutes with everyone for each i,j; i.e., that the dispersion matrix W^{ij} = W_{qi qj} consist of c-numbers only. |
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(Patrick Reany) wrote in message m...
(Daniel Weston) wrote in message ... Patrick, you keep saying that QM is a principle theory, not a constructive theory. Could you explain this conclusion. My interpretation of Einstein's comments that you have given us, is quite different. Thanks. ************************************************** ************ Is QM a principle theory? In the first place, all classifications are arbitrary. In the second place, I know that some posters feel that the "principled vs constructive" distinction serves no useful purpose in physics. I disagree and I'll make clear exactly why I disagree later. The central point of contention in the distinction between principle or constructive theories is the existence of a "hypothetical" ontological element in the theory. What is "hypothetical" and what is not as a physical concept is time dependent and established by convention (Poincare) of the physics community. Einstein's original idea of a hypothetical ontological element was this: If it's assumed to exist, but invisible, it's hypothetical. However, as useful as this notion was a 100 years ago, it's too impractical now. For practicality, instead of saying the "hypothetical electron" we just say the "electron," and hopefully remember that electrons are hypothetical in some ontological sense. I have chosen the term "ontological element" carefully. By "ontology" I mean existence in a material sense. To Einstein, the concepts of the luminiferous ether and the atom, if they should correspond to anything "real" at all, correspond to things materially "real," that is, they correspond to something made of matter. Ordinary matter, whatever it is metaphysically, is well describable physically: It has mass (get enough of it and you can weigh it); it has inertial properties; it is affected by the gravitational fields of other matter particles. Maybe you can think of more. OK, enough introduction. Let's begin with a quote from Einstein: We can distinguish various kinds of theories in physics. Most of them are constructive. They attempt to build up a picture of the more complex phenomena out of the materials of a relatively simple formal scheme from which they start out. Thus the kinetic theory of gases seeks to reduce mechanical, thermal, and diffusional processes to movements of molecules -- i.e., to build them up out of the hypothesis of molecular motion. When we say that we have succeeded in understanding a group of natural processes we invariably mean that a constructive theory has been found which covers the processes in question. Along with this most important class of theories there exists a second, which I will call 'principle-theories'; These employ the analytic, not the synthetic, method. The elements which form their bases and starting-point are not hypothetically constructed but empirically discovered ones, general characteristics of natural processes, principles that give rise to mathematically formulated criteria which these separate processes or the theoretical representations of them have to satisfy. Thus the science of thermodynamics seeks by analytical means to deduce necessary conditions, which separate events have to satisfy, from the universally experienced fact that perpetual motion is impossible. The advantages of the constructive theory are completeness, adaptability, and clearness, those of the principle theory are logical perfection and security of the foundations. The theory of relativity belongs to the latter class. In order to grasp its nature, one needs first of all to become acquainted with the principles on which it is based. Before I go into these, however, I must observe that the theory of relativity resembles a building consisting of two separate stories, the special theory and the general theory. The special theory, on which the general theory rests, applies to all physical phenomena with the exception of gravitation; the general theory provides the law of gravitation and its relations to the other forces of nature. Found in: "What is the Theory of Relativity?", Einstein, Ideas and Opinions, Three Rivers Press, p. 228-9. I have written much on this quote on my website. See http://www.ajnpx.com/html/Science/Ho...long-haul.html http://www.ajnpx.com/html/Einstein's-search-for-meaningful-unification-in-physics.html I can at this point only do two things to clear up what Einstein meant by "principle vs constructive theories": First, I will place his characterizations of them in his time period for a context, providing his insight into Newton's mechanics as a starting point. Second, I will attempt to clarify what I think can be made into a doable and useful definition of these two terms. But first a definition. A "principle" is a law or heuristic in which one has great confidence. What Einstein meant "principle" is the same thing *every* mathemadork since *Euclid* said the same thing: To wit, Geometry has *something* to with "physics". And ever since that time all non-mathematicians have been telling "scientists": MORON has something to do with "science". |
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(sol) wrote in message om...
(Patrick Reany) wrote in message m... (Daniel Weston) wrote in message ... Patrick, you keep saying that QM is a principle theory, not a constructive theory. Could you explain this conclusion. My interpretation of Einstein's comments that you have given us, is quite different. Thanks. ************************************************** ************ Is QM a principle theory? If QM is to fail, which principle that it is based on is going to be the one that fails it? Patrick Sorry for interrupting. If Gr is connected to QM what has been accomplished? Very interesting post. Probability statistics? If uncertainty is said to exist, and probabilty diagrams allow for this to be answered, what value would we find , when energy becomes specific, and identifies each particle? Strings then, would have dismissed uncertainty as well? I am trying to digest the whole of your post. The idea here seems to be a interplay between one position and another, and I find this throughout my studies. A philosphical position first materializes through the logic, and then comes the math? If a generalization is spoken, and philopshically it is correct, then so is the math behind it? I'm not sure what the exact question is, but the answer is probably no. People start with a formal point of view that is constrained by their philosophical preferences, such as whether or not to adhere to logical economy, the PoR, flat spacetime, or whatever. These are decisions that can't be claimed merely on the basis of empircism. Fundamental ideas play the most essential role in forming a physical theory. Books on physics are full of mathematical formulae. But thought and ideas, not formulae, are the beginning of every physical theory. --- Einstein & Infeld, The Evolution of Physics, Touchstone, 1938, p 277. In order to CONSTRUCT a theory, it is not enough to have a clear conception of the goal. One must also have a FORMAL POINT OF VIEW which will sufficiently restrict the unlimited variety of possibilities. --- Einstein, Ideas and Opinions, The fundaments of theoretical physics, p. 328, emphasis mine. Patrick |
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(Alfred Einstead) wrote in message . com...
(Patrick Reany) wrote: (Patrick Reany) wrote: Einstein told us that he was once an etherist. He (apparently) accepted the Mechanical Program's dogma to explain all phenomena in terms of mechanics? But what is mechanics? Mechanics is the science that MODELS all matter as being aggregates of point mass particles in motion. Newton's mechanics adds to that description that masses interact via forces acting-at-a-distance. (Hertz's mechanics -- inspired by his positivist leanings -- does not use the force concept as a primitive.) The logical extension to this rigid approach would be to approximate matter as a continuum state. The mathematical distinction between these two approaches was profound, for in the former case one uses total differential equations and in the latter one uses partial differential equations. Einstein told us that this led the way for the development of field theories of electrodynamics. It's possible to establish continuum mechanics as a 'principle' theory too. One starts with the assertion that for a perfectly cohesive system the discrete (Newtonian) laws apply, particularly: d(mv^2/2)/dt = F.v This is power... ().() denoting the dot product of vectors, and that this relation pertain even in the smallest elements, so that if a system is described by a continuum with m_V = integral_V rho dV; m_V = mass contained in volume V and with Perfect Cohesion: integral_V rho f(x,v) dV = m f(x,v) then d/dt integral_{V(t)} rho v^2/2 dV = integral_{V(t)} rho/m F.v dV over any "comoving" volume V(t) moving with. Is there anyway to explain this simpler, maybe using a quantum of power. This requires a prior conception of the mass continuum being associated with co-moving volumes (i.e., volumes that flow along the streamlines of the velocity field v(t)). From the transport theorem, one then derives the transport equations under the assumption of perfect cohesion: @(rho v^2/2) + del.(v rho v^2/2) = rho b.v @ denotes in ASCII the curly partial derivative symbol where b = F/m is the commonly used symbol to denote the force per unit mass. right, but why is "b" preferred above "a" for acceleration (??). That, then, is the starting point. One has a prior discrete theory (he Newtonian mechanics) and from this arrives at the idealized continuum form, as above. Now, continuum mechanics, itself, follows by imposing two invariance conditions: (0) Correspondence Limit In the limit of perfect cohesiveness, the equations of motion are those derived from the corresponding discrete mechanics. (1) Scale Relativity or Additivity The equations of motion be invariant with respect to changes in level. In particular, if a system is composed of parts sum_a rho_a = rho sum_a (rho_a v_a) = rho v sum_a (rho_a b_a) = rho b then the equations of motion satisfied by the system as a whole are the same in form as those satisfied by each of the parts. I'm presuming rho is density... (2) Galilean Relativity The equations of motion are invariant with respect to changes in the frame of reference. Additionally, one can distinguish fundamentally continuous systems from atomic systems by the assertion: (3) Atomic Hypothesis These exists a decomposition of a system into cohesive subsystems. But this assertion is immaterial for what follows. Since the continuum equations arrived at by (0): Where's (0)? @(rho v^2/2)/@t + v.del(rho v^2/2) = rho b.v are non-linear, and since non-linear combinations generally do not preserve their form under summation of subsystems, these equations are not scale invariant. If I'm not mistaken, you're describing turbulence, and in aeronautics the Reynolds number is uded to scale? This, then, requires off-setting components which, if properly selected, will also be invariant under changes in observer motion. This leads to the definitions of quantities Tij, Wijk, qij to respectively offset combinations of the form rho vi vj, rho vi vj vk, rho vi bj, where v = (v1,v2,v3), b = (b1,b2,b3). Then, one writes scale-invariant forms for the summations: sum (rho_a vi_a vj_a + Tij_a) = rho vi vj + Tij sum (rho_a vi_a vj_a vk_a + Tij_a vk_a + Tik_a vj_a + Tjk_a vi_a + Wijk_a) = rho vi vj vk + Tij vk + Tik vj + Tjk vi + Wijk and sum (rho_a vi_a bj_a + qij_a) = rho vi bj + qij. The quantities if interest in the equation of motion are rho v^2/2, rho v v^2/2, and rho v.b. The corresponding scale-invariant form for rho v^2/2 is then: rho d_ij v^i v^j/2 + d_ij Tij/2 = rho (d_ij v^i v^j/2 + e) = rho (v^2/2 + e) where e = trace(T)/(2 rho). The summation convention is used above, and d_ij stands for the Kroenecker Delta (in ASCII form). For rho v.b, one has rho d_ij v^i b^j + d_ij q^ij = rho v.b + q where q = trace(q). And for rho v v^2/2, one has 1/2 rho d_jk v^i v^j v^k = (rho d_jk v^i v^j v^k + d_jk (Tij v^k + Tik v^j + Tjk v^i) + d_jk Wijk)/2 = rho v^i (v^2/2 + e) + (T.v)^i + w^i where w^i = 1/2 d_jk Wijk = 1/2 Tr_{23}(W) and (T.v)^i = d_jk Tij v^k. The equations of motion then assume the scale-invariant form: @(rho (v^2/2 + e))/@t + del.(v rho (v^2/2 + e) + T.v + w) = rho b.v + q. Under a change in frame of reference to an observe travelling at a speed u relative to the original frame, one has the transformation: v - u + v; @/@t - @/@t - u.del; del - del; rho - rho. If F - F' under the transformation, then the combination @F/@t + del.(v F) transforms to: @F'/@t - u.del F' + del.((u + v) F') = @F'/@t + del.(v F'). The particular forms chosen for the off-setting quantities, T, W, q ensure that these are each invariant under Galilean transformations. Therefore, the original equations transform to: @(rho (|u+v|^2/2 + e)/@t + del.(v rho (|u+v|^2/2 + e) + T.(u+v) + w) = rho b.(u+v) + q. Subtracting out the original equation of motion, one gets: @(rho (u^2/2 + u.v))/@t + del.(v rho (u^2/2 + u.v) + T.u) = rho b.u. This split into a part linear in u, and a part quadratic in u, which each must separately be equated: @(rho u.v)/@t + del.(v rho (u.v) + T.u) = rho b.u and @(rho u^2/2)/@t + del.(v rho u^2/2) = 0. From the first equation, factoring out the u.(), one gets: @(rho v)/@t + del.(rho v v + T) = rho b where (rho v v + T) is the tensor with components (rho v^i v^j + Tij). From the second equation, factoring out the u^2/2, one gets: @rho/@t + del.(rho v) = 0. The quantity T is identitied as the stress tensor of the system, and e as the system's internal energy. They are related by: 1/2 trace(T) = rho e. In fact, this is true for monoatomic gases. For diatomic and polyatomic gases, there is an additional component to e that does not arise from the 1/2 the trace of T. Agreed, would you say these "additional components" are antisymmetric and or nonorthogonal components off the trace, where the trace T solves only mono's? Ken S. Tucker |
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